High School had only fifteen spots on just one female sports team-basketball. Finally, the survey noted that collegiate athletic programs 5 had been recruiting significantly less in the region. As one college coach 6 explained, even the area's rare, exceptional athlete frequently struggled in the collegiate setting, since such athletes had never had the opportunity to become accustomed to competing against the same caliber of athletes when younger.
consider the inequality to be abnormal or problematic.
At its start, Title IX produced numerous opportunities for female secondary school student athletes. Prior to its enactment in 1972, only 300,000 girls played high school sports per year, representing only 7% of high school athletes nationwide. Although Title IX's scope far exceeds athletics-it was 11 designed to eliminate sex discrimination in all educational programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance-its application to athletic programs became apparent by the 1980s. By 1994, over 2.12 million girls played high school sports per year. In short, the immediate effect of Title IX 12 was truly monumental.
However, as the recent Pittsburgh Tribune-Review survey demonstrates, the battle for female athletic equality is far from over. The main problem lies not in the substantive provisions themselves, which do not condone the current status of public secondary school athletic programs in Western Pennsylvania, but rather in the lack of Title IX enforcement. There are two methods for such enforcement: (1) private lawsuits, and (2) investigations by the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights. This Note argues that the availability of punitive damages in private lawsuits is an effective and necessary method to encouraging Title IX compliance. Unfortunately, thus far, virtually no courts have upheld such awards against secondary schools for Title IX violations.
Although this Note uses a Western Pennsylvanian case study as a springboard for its analysis, it does not suggest that Title IX enforcement problems are limited to that area. On the contrary, the Note assumes that Western Pennsylvania is likely representative of many school districts across the nation. In addition, the paper does not portend to suggest that enforcement problems are limited to public K-12 schools. Private and post-secondary schools, which have also had difficulty encouraging Title IX compliance, would benefit from the availability of punitive damages as well.
Part I of this Note will discuss the functions of punitive damages in civil rights cases and their application in the Title IX context. Thereafter, the Note at the better result, the proper analysis was still missing. Regardless of the weakness of the Canty reasoning, it is worth noting that the district court merely denied the school district's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's punitive damages claim; the court did not uphold an actual punitive damages award.
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As of publication time, the district court for the Northern District of Iowa is the only court to properly engage Newport. In Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School District, a female student athlete filed a Title IX 50 complaint alleging that female athletes were treated more severely than male athletes for violating the school district's conduct code. The court examined 51 both prongs of the Newport test in meticulous detail. However, the district 52 court nonetheless disregarded much of this sound analysis and followed the trend of upholding municipal immunity. 53 The first question in a proper Newport analysis is whether Congress intended to disturb the common law municipal immunity in the Title IX context. The Schultzen court quickly held that there was no evidence of Congressional intent to displace the immunity. However, while it is true that 54 Congress did not expressly reject municipal immunity to punitive damages in Title IX actions, the court should not have come to its conclusion so easily because, as the Supreme Court wrote in Franklin, "Congress made no effort [in the Title IX context] . . . to alter the traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right." Since the Franklin 55 Supreme Court did not mention Newport (which was decided more than a decade earlier), a more logical conclusion is that Newport did not alter the availability of appropriate remedies, including punitive damages.
Recent statutory amendments provide further evidence of congressional intent. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expressly exempted municipalities and other governmental entities from punitive damage awards in suits brought under Title VII, The presence of common law municipal immunity in the Title IX context does not solely depend on evidence of Congressional intent. Under Newport, municipal immunity should also be rejected if "public policy dictates a contrary result" for Title IX cases. Unfortunately, the Schultzen court has been the only court to address this second prong of the Newport test.
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As discussed in Part II, supra, Newport had four main bases for its decision that public policy does not requiring waiving municipal immunity in the § 1983 context: (1) waiver would not punish municipal officers, since only innocent taxpayers would shoulder the burden, (2) waiver would not deter municipal officers, since, again, only innocent taxpayers would shoulder the burden, (3) punitive damages against individuals would be a more effective deterrent, and (4) corrective action would likely occur regardless, due to compensatory damage awards and superior officers' concern for government integrity. Regarding the first two rationales, there is no difference between 60 § 1983, the statute at issue in Newport, and Title IX: in both instances, the fact that punitive damages are passed onto innocent taxpayers diminishes in part the punishment and deterrence of municipal officers. However, there is a 61 strong counterargument to the Newport rationale: although the officers will not themselves have to pay the punitive damage awards, they will still likely face repercussions. A punitive damage award, which indicates not just a careless act, but a wrongful act, would be highly publicized and would likely result in at least a termination of employment for those deemed responsible. The officers would probably not be able to hide behind the face of the municipality, as unhappy taxpayers would demand that someone be held accountable. Thus, in both Newport and in the Title IX context, the better argument is that the deterrent effect is intact because municipal officers would be punished if punitive damages against municipalities were allowed. Unlike the first two rationales, the last two Newport rationales do not hold up as well in the Title IX context. First, unlike § 1983 claims, punitive damage awards against individuals do not offer a more effective deterrent, as individuals are not subject to Title IX liability. The Schultzen court quickly noted the importance of the distinction: "[T]he public's interest in preventing future discriminatory conduct in educational institutions may not be capable of full realization under Title IX without the imposition of punitive damages against municipal entities because individual offending officials are not, in their individual capacities, subject to Title IX liability." Thus, this factor 62 clearly counsels for a different result in Title IX lawsuits.
Likewise, unlike § 1983, corrective action is unlikely to occur in Title IX claims in the absence of punitive damages. First, although Title IX's statutory mechanism establishes a procedure for terminating federal funding in the event of a school's noncompliance, such a termination has never occurred in the more than thirty years since Title IX's enactment. The Schultzen court identified this distinction from § 1983 as well, calling the statutory mechanism an "extreme remedy" that is "rarely imposed." Second, and more 63 importantly, unlike § 1983 suits, where individuals may have lost wages, medical bills, pain and suffering damages, etc., there are virtually no cases in which compensatory damages were awarded in Title IX actions against secondary school athletic programs. There is simply no economic value on the opportunity to play sports in the public secondary school context, at least not one that is easily calculated. This factor, which the Schultzen court 64 completely failed to identify, weighs even more strongly when considering that the Newport court was especially concerned with preventing plaintiff windfall-the receipt of both compensatory and punitive damages. under Newport, the removal of punitive damage awards leaves corrective action solely in the hands of superior officers concerned with government integrity. This is tantamount to having no enforcement mechanism at all. If Title IX cannot be enforced, why have it in the first place? There is another distinction between § 1983 and Title IX claims that Newport's reasoning does not expressly address. Unlike § 1983 claims, which cover a wide range of behavior and are commonplace, Title IX claims, especially actions regarding unequal athletic programs, are more rare. Thus, 65 the threat of a flood of litigation and punitive damage awards against public secondary schools is minimal.
Unfortunately, the Schultzen court-the only court to engage in the second prong of the Newport analysis-determined that, although "public policy arguably dictates a divergence from the traditional presumption," the court's inability to find any circuit court decisions authorizing punitive damages without express statutory authority weighed in favor of applying municipal immunity. This conclusion is problematic. If express statutory 66 authority were required, the second prong of the Newport test would be irrelevant. Moreover, the requirement of express statutory authority goes against both Cannon v. University of Chicago, which created an implied private right of action, and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 67 which did not require express language to uphold all appropriate common law remedies. 68 Overall, a proper analysis of Newport in the Title IX context demonstrates that the availability of punitive damages against municipalities is not just a useful deterrent, but a necessary tool to the successful enforcement of Title IX. The cost of enforcement does not need to be high; punitive damages do not need to be pervasive and bankrupting to be effective. Juries-taxpayers and likely members of the local community-will probably not jump at the opportunity to handicap a local public school. Moreover, Title IX's statutory remedy of terminating federal funding could potentially be even more extreme. Unlike private litigation, where a jury can balance the need for punishment and deterrence against harm done to local schools and taxpayers, the termination of federal funding is an uncompromising removal of all federal funds, on which public school budgets depend. In short, the benefits of punitive damages far outweigh the costs. It is well established that Title IX . . . is also modeled after Title VI and is interpreted and applied in the same manner as Title VI. . . . Thus, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Barnes that punitive damages are not available under Title VI compels the conclusion that punitive damages are not available for private actions brought to enforce Title IX.
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The problem is two-fold: first, Barnes itself erred in its application of the Spending Clause to Title VI; second, assuming that Barnes was decided correctly, Mercer erred in applying the same rule in the Title IX context. Unfortunately, even though the case remains unpublished, district courts, 71 with no other circuit court decisions to guide them, have unanimously followed Mercer's lead. The Supreme Court case Barnes v. Gorman concerned an arrested paraplegic who was improperly transported to a police station and refused the opportunity to empty his urine bag, which resulted in serious medical problems, including a bladder infection, serious lower back pain, and uncontrollable spasms in his paralyzed areas. The jury awarded the plaintiff 73 $42,566.33 for medical expenses, $342,251.00 for lost past wages, $500,000.00 for lost future wages, $150,000 for pain and suffering, and $1.2 million in punitive damages. Thereafter, the trial court found that punitive 74 damages were not available as a matter of law and vacated that portion of the award. The Supreme Court affirmed. Although not a Title VI case, the Court 75 determined that punitive damages would not available under Title VI because Title VI was enacted under the Spending Clause. Consequently, the Court 76 explained, since both § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the RA expressly looked to Title VI to determine the scope of available remedies, punitive damages were not available under either statute.
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The Barnes Court erred in its application of the Spending Clause to Title VI. The Supreme Court originally determined that Title VI and Title IX were enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause because Congress attached conditions to the award of federal funds in each statute. As a result, the 78 statutes are interpreted as being in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the entities agree to comply with federal conditions. The of the facts, the Court improperly excused the ignorance of an unambiguous law-the common law availability of punitive damages affirmed in Franklin.
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The Court made two arguments in support of its extension of the Pennhurst-Gebser doctrine, both weak. First, the Court stated that "it is doubtful whether [the recipient] would even have accepted the funding if punitive damages liability was a required condition." However, the 87 contention that a recipient would reject funding due to the possibility of liability for wrongful conduct is extremely circumspect. Entities that receive federal funding rarely have cash to spare. On the contrary, police departments, like public schools, probably already have strained budgets.
Second, the Court warned that punitive damages, when combined with compensatory damages, "could well be disastrous." But the Court did not 88 adequately explain why it was taking this determination out of the hands of the jury. Although the original total award in Barnes was extensive-over $2 million dollars -there is no reason to think that every jury would slap a 89 recipient with excessively high punitive damage awards, especially since recipients are protected by constitutional limitations on such awards. Juries can only award punitive damages when an intent threshold, such as recklessness or malice, has been met. Juries are also asked to consider the defendant's ability to pay punitive damages, and courts have the power to reduce or vacate excessive awards. Finally, in addition to taking the decision out of the hands of the jury, the Supreme Court failed to take into account the possibility that compensatory damages might be an insufficient deterrent in particular circumstances. Interestingly, the Court's concern for excessive awards is at odds with the more extreme express statutory remedy of terminating all federal funding.
Unfortunately, until Congress legislates otherwise, Barnes is binding precedent for Title VI, the ADA, and the RA. However, it is not binding precedent for Title IX. Mercer v. Duke University erred in applying Barnes to Title IX claims, for doing so severely handicaps Title IX's enforcement mechanism, particularly regarding claims of inequality in the athletic programs in public secondary schools.
As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Barnes did not expressly state that punitive damages were unavailable under Title IX, and such language would have been dicta and thus circumspect regardless. More separately to determine which contract law rules are appropriate to apply. An examination of Title IX claims counsels strongly against borrowing the Title VI punitive damages bar. Similar to the application of municipal immunity, discussed in Part II, supra, the main problem with applying Barnes to Title IX claims is that it leaves many plaintiffs, and virtually all plaintiffs that contest unequal athletic programs, without an adequate remedy, effectively handicapping Title IX's enforcement mechanism. The problem lies in the fact that it is nearly impossible to place an economic value on playing sports. This issue is compounded in the secondary school context: although collegiate athletes can possibly cite lost scholarship money as a measure of damages, most younger secondary school athletes can only argue that they have been deprived of the potential to receive future athletic scholarships, which are incredibly speculative. Consequently, unlike Title VI plaintiffs, who might have lost wages or pain and suffering damages to recover, Title IX plaintiffs will generally not have a claim for compensatory damages.
If found that the coach had discriminated against Mercer on the basis of her gender and awarded her $1 in compensatory damages-Mercer did not have an athletic scholarship and there was no other measure of compensatory damages-and $2 million in punitive damages.
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Unfortunately, Mercer did not get to keep her award. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, citing Barnes, vacated the punitive damage award. In 104 addition, the district court thereafter reduced Mercer's attorneys' fees award by 20%. Using twisted logic, the court explained that Mercer had not received the required "excellent results": although Mercer had established that Duke was liable for gender discrimination, Mercer had been unable to prove compensatory damages and her punitive damage award had been vacated. 105 Thus, Mercer felt the blow of the vacated punitive damage award twice. After years of litigation, Mercer was left with virtually nothing.
As Mercer demonstrates, not only does the unavailability of punitive damages eliminate schools' incentive to comply with Title IX prior to litigation, it significantly reduces female athletes' interest in bringing Title IX suits in the first place. This is especially problematic in the Title IX sports context, where incentives are already low. First, unlike the average litigant, Title IX plaintiffs are under a strict time constraint-they graduate. Female athletes, especially those in their last years of secondary school, might decide that the likelihood that they would miss the benefits of injunctive relief weighs against the time and expensive of litigation. Furthermore, unless plaintiffs file class actions, which are more cumbersome and costly than individual lawsuits, plaintiffs face the risk that their claims might become moot upon graduation, making the entire ordeal for naught.
A second problem is that, unlike college athletes, who often travel to attend school, plaintiffs from secondary schools must fight an institution that is deeply ingrained in their community. As such, plaintiffs may face severe criticism not only from members of the school, but also from friends, prominent members of the community, or other community institutions. Punitive damages give wronged plaintiffs additional incentive to overcome
